The
mere mention of al Qaeda conjures images of an efficient terrorist
network guided by a powerful criminal mastermind. Yet al Qaeda is more
lethal as an ideology than as an organization. “Al Qaedaism” will
continue to attract supporters in the years to come—whether Osama bin
Laden is around to lead them or not.
“Al Qaeda Is a Global Terrorist Organization”
No. It is less an organization than an ideology. The Arabic word qaeda can
be translated as a “base of operation” or “foundation,” or alternatively as
a “precept” or “method.” Islamic militants always understood the term in the
latter sense. In 1987, Abdullah Azzam, the leading ideologue for modern Sunni
Muslim radical activists, called for al-qaeda al-sulbah (a vanguard of the
strong). He envisaged men who, acting independently, would set an example for
the rest of the Islamic world and thus galvanize the umma (global community
of believers) against its oppressors. It was the FBI—during its investigation
of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa—which dubbed the loosely linked
group of activists that Osama bin Laden and his aides had formed as “al Qaeda.” This
decision was partly due to institutional conservatism and partly because the
FBI had to apply conventional antiterrorism laws to an adversary that was in
no sense a traditional terrorist or criminal organization.
Although bin Laden and his partners were able to create a structure in Afghanistan
that attracted new recruits and forged links among preexisting Islamic militant
groups, they never created a coherent terrorist network in the way commonly
conceived. Instead, al Qaeda functioned like a venture capital firm—providing
funding, contacts, and expert advice to many different militant groups and
individuals from all over the Islamic world.
Today, the structure that was built in Afghanistan has been destroyed, and
bin Laden and his associates have scattered or been arrested or killed. There
is no longer a central hub for Islamic militancy. But the al Qaeda worldview,
or “al Qaedaism,” is growing stronger every day. This radical internationalist
ideology—sustained by anti-Western, anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric—has
adherents among many individuals and groups, few of whom are currently linked
in any substantial way to bin Laden or those around him. They merely follow
his precepts, models, and methods. They act in the style of al Qaeda, but they
are only part of al Qaeda in the very loosest sense. That's why Israeli intelligence
services now prefer the term “jihadi international” instead of “al Qaeda.”
“Capturing or Killing Bin Laden Will Deal a Severe Blow to Al Qaeda”
Wrong. Even for militants with identifiable ties to bin Laden, the
death of the “sheik” will make little difference in their ability to recruit
people. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently acknowledged as
much when he questioned in an internal Pentagon memo whether it was possible
to kill militants faster than radical clerics and religious schools could create
them. In practical terms, bin Laden now has only a very limited ability to
commission acts of terror, and his involvement is restricted to the broad strategic
direction of largely autonomous cells and groups. Most intelligence analysts
now consider him largely peripheral.
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This turn of events should surprise no one. Islamic militancy predates bin
Laden's activities. He was barely involved in the Islamic violence of the early
1990s in Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia, and Kashmir. His links to the 1993 World Trade
Center attack were tangential. There were no al Qaeda training camps during
the early 1990s, although camps run by other groups churned out thousands of
highly trained fanatics. Even when bin Laden was based in Afghanistan in the
late 1990s, it was often Islamic groups and individuals who sought him out
for help in finding resources for preconceived attacks, not vice versa. These
days, Islamic groups can go to other individuals, such as Jordanian activist
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who set up his al Tauhid group in competition with bin
Laden (rather than, as is frequently claimed, in alliance with him) to obtain
funds, expertise, or other logistical assistance.
Bin Laden still plays a significant role in the movement as a propagandist
who effectively exploits modern mass communications. It is likely that the
United States will eventually apprehend bin Laden and that this demonstration
of U.S. power will demoralize many militants. However, much depends on the
manner in which he is captured or killed. If, like deposed Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, he surrenders without a fight, which is very unlikely, many
followers will be deeply disillusioned. If he achieves martyrdom in a way that
his cohorts can spin as heroic, he will be an inspiration for generations to
come. Either way, bin Laden's removal from the scene will not stop Islamic
militancy.
“The Militants Seek to Destroy the West
so They Can Impose a Global Islamic State”
False. Islamic militants' main objective is not conquest, but to beat
back what they perceive as an aggressive West that is supposedly trying to
complete the project begun during the Crusades and colonial periods of denigrating,
dividing, and humiliating Islam. The militants' secondary goal is the establishment
of the caliphate, or single Islamic state, in the lands roughly corresponding
to the furthest extent of the Islamic empire of the late first and early second
centuries. Today, this state would encompass the Middle East, the Maghreb (North
Africa bordering the Mediterranean), Andalusia in southern Spain, Central Asia,
parts of the Balkans, and possibly some Islamic territories in the Far East.
Precisely how this utopian caliphate would function is vague. The militants
believe that if all Muslims act according to a literal interpretation of the
Islamic holy texts, an almost mystical transformation to a just and perfect
society will follow.