Subverting the Channel.
Attack 2 - copy legitimate IDs from existing products
Attack 3 - Steal bulk IDs from the database
Attack 4 - Subverting the Channel
Attack 5- Subverting the Database
Attack 6 - Subverting the Server
If the potential profit is high enough, the counterfeiter will try the next level attack: Subversion of the communications to the database. They will try to upload their own data.
Although we can be confident (as spelt out in dealing with Attack 3) that counterfeiters can not obtain data of value from the Codel database, even if they have unrestricted access to it, we need to be equally confident that they haven't subverted the channel by which we obtain the data in the first place and sent apparent valid data to us which appears to have come from a legitimate source. We need to know that any data arrives with the full corporate authority of the relevant Brand Owner.
To combat this possibility, we require comprehensive "strong authentication" of users entitled to upload data, and (a minimum of) dual permissions required to authorise any upload (preferably with the second permission randomly selected from a panel of authorised uploaders nominated by each manufacturer) A copy of the online update will also be sent back, through a channel randomly selected by us, to a different randomly selected authorised representative for further confirmation.
In addition, although the uploaded data is of no special help to the counterfeiter, it does contain data which could be of value in the context of simple commercial espionage. (Volumes shipped, shipping points, dates of shipping etc etc) For which reason, in addition to the strong authentication required to initiate the transfer, the data transfer itself will be protected with strong encryption.
